Software Agents as Facilitators of Coherent Coalition Operations by Allsopp, D et al.
v2 - May 2001 
 
SOFTWARE AGENTS AS FACILITATORS OF 
COHERENT COALITION OPERATIONS 
 
 





Dr David Allsopp (DERA, UK). 
(dallsopp@signal.dera.gov.uk E211, DERA Malvern, Worcestershire, WR14 3PS, UK). 
 
Squadron Leader Patrick Beautement1 (DERA, UK)*. 
(PBeautement@dera.gov.uk E109, DERA Malvern, Worcestershire, WR14 3PS, UK). 
 
Dr Jeffrey M Bradshaw (IHMC / UWF, USA) 
(jbradshaw@ai.uwf.edu IHMC / UWF, Pensacola, FLORIDA  FL  32501, USA). 
 
Dr John Carson (DERA, UK). 
(jcarson@signal.dera.gov.uk E203, DERA Malvern, Worcestershire, WR14 3PS, UK). 
 
Dr Michael Kirton (DERA, UK). 
(kirton@signal.dera.gov.uk E206, DERA Malvern, Worcestershire, WR14 3PS, UK). 
 
Dr Niranjan Suri (IHMC / UWF, USA) 
(nsuri@ai.uwf.edu  IHMC / UWF, Pensacola, FLORIDA  FL  32501, USA). 
 
Prof Austin Tate (AIAI, Edinburgh, UK).  
 (a.tate@ed.ac.uk  AIAI, The University of Edinburgh, EH1 IHN, UK). 
 
03 May 2001 
 
 
For presentation at: 
6th International CCRTS, 19 - 21 June 2001 




                                                
1 Primary Point of Contact* 
 
 1 
SOFTWARE AGENTS AS FACILITATORS OF 
COHERENT COALITION OPERATIONS 
 
Dr David Allsopp (DERA, UK). 
(dallsopp@signal. dera.gov.uk E211, DERA Malvern, Worcestershire, WR14 3PS, UK). 
Squadron Leader Patrick Beautement (DERA, UK) *. 
(PBeautement@dera.gov.uk E109, DERA Malvern, Worcestershire, WR14 3PS, UK). 
Dr Jeffrey M Bradshaw (IHMC / UWF, USA) 
(jbradshaw@ai.uwf.edu IHMC / UWF, Pensacola, FLORIDA  FL  32501, USA). 
Dr John Carson (DERA, UK). 
(jcarson@signal.dera.gov.uk E203, DERA Malvern, Worcestershire, WR14 3PS, UK). 
Dr Michael Kirton (DERA, UK). 
(kirton@signal.dera.gov.uk E206, DERA Malvern, Worcestershire, WR14 3PS, UK). 
Dr Niranjan Suri (IHMC / UWF, USA) 
(nsuri@ai.uwf.edu  IHMC / UWF, Pensacola, FLORIDA  FL  32501, USA). 
Prof Austin Tate (AIAI, Edinburgh, UK). 




Software agents can be viewed as semi-autonomous entities which help people cope with the 
complexities of working collaboratively in a distributed information environment. This paper 
describes the research that DERA is carrying out into Software Agents for use in Command 
Systems and the collaborative work with the 16 partners of an international Coalition Agents 
Experiment. Specifically, the paper aims to show that using software agent-based C2 frameworks 
is a useful way of dealing with the complexity of real-world problems such as supporting agile 
and robust Coalition operations and enabling interoperability between legacy or previously 
incompatible systems. In addition, Agent-enabled 'grids' can be used to rapidly integrate a wide 
variety of agents and infrastructures, with domain management services structuring agent 
relationships, limiting their behaviours and enforcing Coalition policies. 
 
 
Section 1- Introduction and Background 
 
1. Software agents are currently receiving much attention in the research community. This 
interest is being driven by the phenomenal growth of the Internet and the World-Wide-Web. 
Agents can be viewed as semi-autonomous software designed to help people cope with the 
complexities of working collaboratively in a distributed information environment. This involves 
the agents communicating between the users and between themselves. The agents are used to 
find, format, filter and share information, and work with users to make the information available 
wherever and whenever users need it. This paper describes the research that DERA is carrying 
out into Software Agents for use in Command Systems (SACIS) and the progress which is being 







2. Success in military operations involves carrying out high-tempo, coherent, decisive 
actions (faster than an opponent can react) resulting in decision dominance through the use of 
command agility. Command agility is about being flexible and adaptable so that fleeting 
opportunities can be grasped. This is done by the Commander issuing clear intent and then 
delegating the control authority to subordinates - allowing them the scope to exercise initiative. It 
also means being innovative, creative and unpredictable in a manner that (even if low-tempo) 
increases confusion in the mind of an opponent. This process is command led, which means that 
human decision-making is primary and that the role of technology is secondary. Shared 
understanding and Information Superiority are key enablers in this process and are fundamental 
to initiatives such as the UK's Joint Battlespace Digitisation programme2. Concepts such as 
Network-centric Warfare (see http://www.dodccrp.org/ncw.htm) also demand a more 
decentralised approach such as that provided by software agents. 
3. In addition to the problems of integrating single-service and Joint capabilities into a 
coherent force, the nature of Coalition (now often just called multi-national) operations implies 
some need to configure incompatible 'come-as-you-are', or foreign systems, into a cohesive 
whole rapidly. Many problems in this environment can only be solved by organisational changes 
and by 'aligning' doctrine, concepts of operations and procedures. Coalition scenarios trigger the 
need for a rapid on-the-fly response and cannot be predicated on using pre-existing co-ordinated 
systems - hence the need for a flexible approach which allows capabilities to be assembled at 
'run-time'. However, in addressing this requirement for interoperability, it is also crucial to 
address issues of security of data, control over semi-trusted software from other Coalition 
partners, and robustness of the resulting system (e.g. the ability to withstand denial-of-service 
attacks). 
4. The current reality of Coalition Operations is often a picture of data overload and 
information starvation, labour intensive collection and co-ordination, individual stove-pipe 
systems, incompatible formats, scattered snapshots of the battlespace, and a horrendous technical 
integration task. This paper aims to show that the agent-based computing paradigm offers a 
promising new approach to dealing with such issues by embracing the open, heterogeneous, 
diverse and dispersed nature of the Coalition environment. Indeed, for 'Cyberspace Superiority' 
to be obtained (as part of the Battlespace) then it is essential that the Coalition Forces are able to 
act decisively inside Cyberspace and that the only way that this can be achieved is though a 
variety of software agents acting on behalf of, or mediating the actions of, human users within 
Cyberspace - as well as at its margins and beyond. 
 
Aims of the "Software Agents in Command Information Systems" and CoAX Projects 
 
5. In this paper, we report on early progress in DERA's Software Agents in Command 
Information Systems (SACIS) project. Included in this is a related international collaborative 
effort whose overall goals are to demonstrate that the agent-based computing paradigm offers a 
                                                
2 Which aims to integrate the use of information across the Joint arena by exploiting appropriate doctrine, 
organisations and procedures, personnel and technology. 
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promising new approach to dealing with the technical issues of establishing coherent command 
and control (C2) in a Coalition organisation. This collaborative effort is being carried out under 
the auspices of DARPA's Control of Agent Based System (CoABS) programme, which provides 
a software agent-enabled "Grid" (see http://dtsn.darpa.mil/iso/ or http://coabs.globalinfotek.com/ 
). The collaborative effort is called CoAX (Coalition Agents eXperiment) and it is a CoABS 
technology integration experiment (TIE) - see http://www.aiai.ed.ac.uk/project/coax/. The 
overall objectives of all this research are to determine and demonstrate the potential effectiveness 
of software agent technology to assist with issues of interoperability, etc in the context of 
military command systems. Specifically, the aims are to show that: 
• agents are a useful metaphor for the complexity of real-world systems such as military 
operations; 
• an agent-based C2 framework can support agile and robust Coalition operations; 
• software agents can be used to enable interoperability between legacy or previously 
incompatible systems; 
• the CoABS Grid can be used to rapidly integrate a wide variety of agents and systems - 
i.e., rapid creation of virtual organisation; 
• domain policies can structure agent relationships and enforce Coalition policies; 
• intelligent task and process management can improve agent collaboration; 
• and that semantic interoperability can improve agent collaboration and interoperability 
between disparate Coalition command systems. 
 
The SACIS and CoAX research has built a software agent testbed based on the DARPA CoABS 
Grid and this paper will describe the work done, the demonstrations carried out so far, the 
scenario and storyboard used and some of the initial insights which have been gained. 
 
Structure of the Paper 
 
6. The paper begins by providing a brief description of the key ideas and technologies 
underpinning software agents in Section 2. Section 3 describes the Coalition scenario and 
military command structure used in our demonstration experiments. Section 4 describes the 
corresponding agent architecture that was developed to reflect the military organisational 
structure. The events occurring in the storyboard used for the demonstrations so far are given in 
Section 5. A preliminary assessment of software agent capabilities and a discussion of future 
research are provided in Section 6. Concluding remarks are given in Section 7.  
 
Section 2 - Software Agent Technology 
 
7. There are a number of very good sources describing the state-of-art in software agent 
research and applications: see, for example, the Web site hosted by the University of Maryland 
[1]; the review article by Jennings et al [2]; the collection of research papers edited by Huhns and 
Singh [3]; the book edited by Bradshaw [4]; and the papers in the special issue of IEEE 
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Intelligent Systems [5]. Although there is no comprehensive and widely accepted definition of 
the notion of software agent [6], Jennings et al provide a useful working description: 
''An agent is a computer system situated in some environment that is capable of 
flexible autonomous action.'' 
 
8. Jennings et al point out that "being situated" means that an agent is part of an 
environment from which it receives sensory input and that the agent can change in some way. 
Autonomy means that an agent should be able to act without the direct intervention of users. 
Flexibility implies that the system is responsive, pro-active and social - i.e., agents should, in 
principle, be able to interact with other agents and humans.  
IVE (Avatar)
KEY: Information transfersHousekeepingSW-Agent ConversationOpponent Activities Human-Agent 'Conversation'
Four types of agents:
•  MA / Mediator (green),
•  IA / Information (blue),
•  HA / Hostile (red).
















Figure 1 - Types of Software Agent 
 
Figure 1 shows four main types of software agents. The 'Housekeeping Agent' (HK) is an entity 
which is responsible for assisting with the maintenance of Cyberspace, for example, by adjusting 
resource loading, monitoring for adverse performance, network routing, etc. The 'Information 
Agent' (IA) facilitates the movement, analysis and formatting of information in and through 
Cyberspace. A third entity is the 'Mediator Agent' (MA) which is the focal point of interaction 
between the human user and the underlying information, 'applications' and Cyberspace itself. In 
addition, there may be hostile versions of these agents. In SACIS and CoAX we use the 




"Agents can be viewed as (software) entities acting on behalf of, or mediating the 
actions of, a human user and having the ability to carry out tasks autonomously to 
achieve goals or support the activities of the user." 
 
9. In order for agents to communicate with one another and to share information, agent 
communication languages (ACLs) have been developed. There are two main ACLs: the 
Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language (KQML) and the Foundation for Intelligent 
Physical Agents (FIPA) ACL [7]. These languages handle propositions, rules and actions and are 
therefore at a higher level of abstraction than middleware such as CORBA (common object 
request broker architecture) and RMI (remote method invocation). In addition, there has been 
much work on the provision of a machine-understandable semantic-web of information such as 
eXtensible Markup Language (XML) and the Resource Description framework (RDF). Software 
agents can use RDF to advertise and describe their capabilities and can parse RDF descriptions 
to ascertain the relevance and utility of information provided by other agents. DARPA has 
recognised the potential contribution that technologies such as RDF could make to achieve 
semantic interoperability among software agents and has a new programme underway called 
DAML (DARPA Agent Mark-up Language [8]). The overall goal of the DAML programme is to 
develop a language aimed at representing semantic relations in machine-readable ways 
compatible with current and future Internet technologies. We are currently working on a 
specification and implementation of a DAML-based policy language  (KAoS Policy Language or 
KPL), which will be used in CoAX to represent both simple atomic policies and complex 
constructions. 
10.  One way of viewing a community of agents is as a set of distributed, asynchronous 
processes communicating and sharing information by message passing in some infrastructure. In 
this regard, an important output from DARPA's CoABS programme is the CoABS Grid - a 
middleware layer based on Java / Jini technology that provides the computing infrastructure to 
integrate heterogeneous agent communities and systems rapidly. In a recent article, Jennings [9], 
argues that the agent paradigm is a good way of building complex software systems in general. 
Hence the potential benefit of using software agents in the Coalition setting, for example, where 
legacy command systems could be provided with software agent wrappers that allow them to 
inter-operate and share information with other systems and agent applications in a loosely 
connected, heterogeneous architecture that is underpinned by the CoABS Grid. The scenario, 
used as the basis of the experiments to test this hypothesis, is described in the next section. 
 
Section 3 - A Representative Scenario and Coalition Command Structure 
 
The SACIS and CoAX work needed a suitably realistic scenario for its experiments and so the 
Team expanded the fictional "Binni" scenario developed by Dr. A.R. Rathmell [10] for The 
Technology Co-operation Programme 3 (TTCP). In this scenario the year is 2012 and global 
warming has altered the political balance of the world. The action is set in an area that is 
currently the Sudanese Plain [see Figure 2 below]. Previously uninhabited land in the Plain is 
now arable and the area has received large amounts of foreign investment. A conflict has 
                                                
3 The C3I Group, Technical Panel 9. 
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developed between two countries who are fighting for control of Binni. To the north is Gao - 
which has expansionist aspirations but which is only moderately developed, with old equipment 
and with a mostly agrarian society. To the south is Agadez a relatively well developed and 
fundamentalist country. Gao has managed to annex an area of land, called it Binni and has put in 
its own puppet government. This action has come under fierce attack from Agadez. Gao has 
played the 'threat of weapons of mass destruction from Agadez' card and has enlisted support 
from the UN who have deployed a force, the UN War Avoidance Force for Binni (UNWAFB), 

































KEY Tarmac roads175 Heights (metres) Railways
Brongo Ports Civilian Airfields TracksQ





























































































































































































Figure 2 - Map of Binni showing Firestorm Deception 
 
11.  The UNWAFB has arrived in theatre and is not being opposed by Agadez. Gao is 
providing 'host nation' support in Binni at the ports and airports in the east and the Coalition 
Forces are working through an initial planning phase. One of the options under consideration is 
to lay down a 'firestorm' between the Gao and Agadez forces in this region. This will prove to be 
contentious as Gao will try to provide false information to displace the Firestorm. Also, the 
international media will hear of the operation and will object to the bombing taking place near a 
wildlife refuge area (the Laki Safari Park). 
12.  This Binni Coalition (multi-national) operation needs to rapidly configure various 
incompatible, 'come-as-you-are' or foreign systems into a cohesive whole within an open, 
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heterogeneous diverse and dispersed environment. This scenario provides a suitable test for the 
software agent experiments, where the run-time composability of software agents is a very close 
metaphor for the dynamic uncertainty of Coalition Operations. The complexity of the situation 
must not be underestimated and is best illustrated by looking at the Binni Coalition Command 
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Figure 3 - Representative Coalition Command Structure 
 
13.  This is a representative and realistic Coalition command structure involving the UN, 
Governments, Other Government Departments (OGDs - such as the Foreign Office), Non-
Government Organisations (NGOs - such as Oxfam), representatives of all the Coalition 
Countries (with their own 'ghosted' Command Structures) and the Coalition HQs and subordinate 
fighting forces. The solid black lines on the diagram show the legal lines of command authority 
(the 'command chain') and accountability. Dashed lines show an advisory / negotiating role. This 
is the kind of Coalition structure which would be agreed by the participants and no part of it is 
'owned' by any specific country. Other possible Components (Logistics, Special Forces (SF) etc) 
are not shown. Note that the 'Levels of Command' overlap and their boundaries are not rigidly 
defined - as a general rule though, the JTFHQ and Component HQs span the critical operational / 








14.  Integrating the use of information across a Coalition is not just a matter of employing 
technology - it involves the creation of a coherent 'interoperability of the mind' at the human 
level as well as exploiting appropriate doctrine, organisations, personnel and procedures. In a 
Coalition many soc ial and cultural factors, therefore, come into play. The SACIS and CoAX 
Teams realised that the mapping between the human and technical worlds was not 
straightforward and that, from the human perspective, four kinds of 'domains' could be identified 
as follows: 
• Organisational Domains:   These relate to a span of control or legal authority of a 
command entity where information would be shared across the domain at a common 
security level. The SACIS and CoAX work has focussed on the Joint level of command - 
in particular on two organisation domains: the Joint Task Force HQ (JTF HQ) and the 
Joint Force Air Component HQ (JFAC HQ). Technically, the JTF HQ and the JFAC HQ 
are sub-domains of the Coalition Organisational structure shown in Figure 3. 
• Country Domains.  Each of the National command chains would be a separate, self-
contained 'domain' with its own processes, information, security regime etc. The interface 
with the Coalition is often through the National Representatives (liaison officers) who 
carry out any necessary 'translation' and act as a 'safety gap' for security reasons. Figure 3 
shows each Nation 'ghosting' all of the Command HQs - in practice each Nation will 
provide different degrees of command 'presence' throughout the Battlespace. 
• Functional Domains.   These relate to a set of entities collaborating on a common task. 
Such domains may be virtual (ie exist only in Cyberspace), are often informal and may 
come and go as the military imperative changes. A more formal functional domain would 
be the Intelligence community which spans various levels of command. 
• Individual Human Domains of Responsibility. In simple terms Commanders have 
responsibility for the effective running of their own HQ and all the subordinate ones (in 
practice they delegate this authority). Hence the individual human domains of influence 
may overlap - shown with the shapes with irregular boundaries on Figure 3 above. 
 
These types of domains are not entirely exclusive and there are many different levels of overlap 
and interaction depending on the viewpoint taken. It is this complexity at the human level that 
create difficulties for technical systems. 
 
Software Agent Domains 
 
15.  A software agent domain could be more tightly defined in technical terms as follows: 
"Software agent domains are bounded objects (which can interoperate via 
intermediate structures) with clear identities and ethos. Each domain contains 
entities and structures working collaboratively and sharing information, processes 




Hence, the SACIS and CoAX Teams maintain that software agent domains provide a better 
mapping to the human domains described above than some other technical approaches. The next 
section explains how the software-agent domains were defined and how they operate. 
 
16.  In a software-agent-enabled infrastructure (such as the CoABS Grid) agent domain 
management services are defined. These services will evolve from and enhance existing services 
available within the software agent framework.  An agent domain consists of a unique instance 
of a domain manager (DM) along with any agents that are registered to it. The function of a 
domain manager is to: 1) manage agent registration, 2) serve as a single point of administration 
for policy management. That is, the domain manager could configure, re-configure, store, 
publish and enforce polices that exist for that domain. Domains assure those who deploy agents 
systems that there is policy uniformity across multiple platforms and hosts, as long as 
semantically equivalent monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are available across those 
platforms and hosts. Under these conditions, it would follow that a given domain could extend 
across host boundaries and, conversely, multiple domains could exist concurrently on the same 
host. With respect to platform independence, it should be possible for agents running on the 
same platform to be in different domains (for example, a resident and a visiting mobile agent 
running on the same platform may belong to different domains having more or less restrictive 
security privileges). In addition, domains contain match-makers (MM) which work together to 
provide information about local and remote agent services that are available. 
17.  A policy is a machine-readable set of statements in which some element (such as an 
agent) of an agent system declares a specification intended to describe or govern its interaction 
with other elements of the agent system. For example, an agent may declare a policy that all 
messages it exchanges with other agents must be encrypted, or that certain timing and message 
sequencing constraints must be observed when requesting a particular kind of service from that 
agent. The latter is an example of a conversation policy. A domain manager has policies such as: 
• no agents registered to its domain may communicate with agents outside the domain; 
• no agent can consume more than a given fraction of some system resource; 
• agents must respond to messages from the domain manager within a given time frame; 
• agents with higher priority tasks pre-empt lower priority ones.  
 
The policy is expressed in a persistent machine-readable format, which could be interpreted by a 
platform-specific policy enforcement mechanism. At the current time, the representation is very 
simple, but a more powerful representation in DAML is currently being defined. Policy and 
policy-enforcement mechanisms could be defined in multiple locations in a given 
implementation. The separation of policy specification from policy-enforcement mechanisms 
allows policies to be dynamically reconfigurable, and relatively more flexible, fine-grained, and 
extensible. Agent developers can build applications whose policies can change without 
necessarily requiring changes in source code. The rationale for using declarative policies to 
describe and govern behaviour in agent systems includes the following claims: easier recognition 
of non-normative behaviour, policy reuse, operational efficiency, ability to respond to changing 




Software Agent Domains in SACIS and CoAX 
 
18.  The SACIS and CoAX Teams have set up a demonstration containing 23 separate 
software agents grouped into 6 agent domains (including one sub-domain). The interoperability 
of the agents and systems was made possible using the inter-agent communications services 
provided by the DARPA CoABS Grid, with the policies enforced by KAoS4 domain 
management services. Figure 4 below shows that within each agent domain there is a 
matchmaker (MM) and domain manager (DM), and then a set of software agents and agent-






































Figure 4 - Software Agent Domain Mappings 
 
19.  The SACIS and CoAX teams have carried out a number of experiments. In the one 
described here two legacy systems from different nations were brought together and agent-
enabled, along with an agent process management tool. In addition, a number of agent-wrapped 
databases, agent-wrapped public domain Internet information and agent domain and policy 
administration and malicious agent management tools were provided. The supporting 
infrastructure was built on the DARPA Grid. 
                                                
4 Knowledgeable Agent-oriented System - from IHMC / UWF and Boeing. 
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20.  In the JFAC HQ the Joint Force Air Component Commander's (JFACC) staff use a UK 
tool called the Master Battle Planner (MBP). The MBP assists the planners by providing them 
with a visualisation - which relates directly to their way of thinking because it is an Expressive 
System [11] - on which they can manipulate the air intelligence information, assets, targets and 
missions etc to build up an Air Battle Plan. The MBP has been given a software agent wrapper to 
enable it to bring together information from the various Coalition partners in near real-time - and 
this provides a significant improvement in overall capability. 
21.  There is also a weather cell in the JFAC HQ which can acquire information from the 
Internet via the Ariadne (see http://www.isi.edu/info-agents/ariadne/ ) software agent. Ariadne 
runs off-site and gathers information from a number of weather web-sites. WeatherViz shows a 
world map, a region-of-interest map and the weather reports received. This information is put 
onto the agent information Grid where it is picked up by MBP and other agents and can be used 
by the operators to inform planning - again, a significant improvement in capability. 
 
Figure 5 - The Process Panel 
 
22.  The Process Panel (PP), see Figure 5 above, in the JTF HQ domain is an agent-based tool 
for providing the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) with a campaign 'process' visualisation. 
One window shows the main military events in a schematic view, whilst the others show other 
views such as task breakdown and process products. Colours are used to indicate the status of the 
events. This tool can be used to plan, evaluate, schedule, review and monitor courses of action 
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and, through the use of software agents, the PP can 'sense' remotely the status of activities which 
increases Coalition situational awareness and provides a warning of possible critica l path events.  
23.  The US country domain has access to an agent-enabled tool called the Consolidated Air 
Mobility Planning System (CAMPS). This consists of a map display and a number of tools for 
managing airlift assets, their home bases and potential destinations, information about loads and 
for creating airlift missions. The domain also contains an agent-wrapped air operations data base 
(AODB) which has US Intelligence and Operations information in it. Some of this information is 
made available to the Coalition via the software agent wrapper - improving Coalition situational 
awareness and reducing the chance of conflicts. 
24.  In addition, there is a functional domain dealing with feeds from observers in the field. 
These observers are from several countries, from different parts of the organisation and involve 
different flavours of agent (eg the Dartmouth Agadez Observer (DAO) is a surrogate agent for 
D'agents from Dartmouth College, USA). There are also Gao observer agents but, as there is 
some distrust of these agents, they are put in a more secure, guarded domain which exploits the 
security and resource control aspects of NOMADS. In particular, the resource control 
mechanisms can protect hosts from denial-of-service attacks from malicious agents. This use of 
software agents has allowed greater interoperability, but a risk assessment shows that appropriate 
measures have also been introduced to protect security. 
 
Section 5 - Experiment Story Board 
 
25.  Several demonstrations have been given of the results of the SACIS / CoAX work and 
screen movies and briefings are available on the CoAX web site mentioned in Section 1. In 
addition, the demonstration was successfully given to military staffs in Miami in February 2001 
leading to a request for the Team to bid for participation in Millennium Challenge 2002 and 
JEFX 2002. The demonstrations have used a militarily plausible story board which showed 
Coalition, Country and Observers information being located, fused and employed to meet 
military imperatives during initial planning in the Binni scenario. 
26.  The demonstration begins in the JFAC HQ where the Air Component Commander's staff 
bring together information from the various Coalition partners. They use the MBP, whose 
wrapper agent detects the human activity and which then sends out requests for updates to the 
various Coalition agent information resources. Once information has been received, the MBP 
(see Figure 6 below) displays icons for enemy potential targets such as airbases, ground forces, 
and SAM sites; and for friendly air units, ships and airspace regions.  
27.  The JFACC Staffs have also received the JTFC's Guidance documents and they 
acknowledge their receipt on the MBP. This triggers an agent which informs the JTFC's Staffs of 
this via the Process Panel, which now shows that the documents have been received by the JFAC 
HQ, and changes the status of related tasks to show that they can now proceed. This means that 
software agents are enabling the JTFC to monitor the progression of the overall planning task 
throughout the Coalition and be alerted quickly if critical-path events are occurring. 
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28.  Back in the JFAC HQ the staff gather more information about the Theatre of Operations. 
They need to know about the weather in the Firestorm area, the disposition of Gao and Agadez 
ground forces, and whether there are any other air missions in the area. An operator uses 
WeatherViz to select the appropriate weather station and requests an update from Ariadne 
(which extracts the relevant data from publicly available information on the Internet). Once this 
information arrives it is sent to the MBP and appears as an icon on the map display. This shows 
how the software-agent enabled infrastructure can allow operators to access suitable information 
as and when they need it, regardless of where it is located.  
 
 
Figure 6 - Master Battle Planner 
 
29.  While this has been going on, in the USA Country Domain, work has started on planning 
the movement of critical weapons into the Theatre of Operations. The Firestorm requires the use 
of a new weapon and the USA intends to fly the weapons to Cyprus and then into Theatre. An 
operator uses the software agent GUI (which could be done remotely with the software agents 
mediating the interaction) on CAMPS to edit the load and number of aircraft to be sent. The plan 
is validated by CAMPS and a route generated from Cyprus into Binni. The operator accepts the 
plan and tells CAMPS to "Achieve it" which means that an order is generated containing all the 
relevant information. The missions generated are then sent through the agent infrastructure and 
displayed automatically in the MBP. In the JFAC HQ, when the planners subsequently generate 
 
 14 
the necessary offensive, defensive and support missions for the Firestorm, as they now know 
about the airlift missions and won't create other missions which would conflict with them.  
30.  Back in the JFAC HQ, the planners are examining the Firestorm options in detail. Based 
on initial Intel, the RECCE area and possible Firestorm target areas have been defined. However, 
unknown to the Coalition staffs, Gao doesn't like the Firestorm option and is trying to subvert it 
by feeding in misinformation about the location (see Figure 2) of Gao and Agadez forces. The 
Coalition has observers in the field who have been feeding in their observations, which are 
different to those from Gao. To firm-up the Firestorm options the planners check the currently 
known positions of Gao and Agadez forces. They do this by double-clicking on several of the 
assets on MBP's map display. This triggers software agents to request other agents to return their 
up-to-date information on the assets - for some of the assets two dialog boxes pop-up containing 
different information - one from the Gao agents and one from the JFAC HQ's Intel agents. The 
planners realise the deception and decide to cut off the communication with the Gao agents. 
31.  The Coalition System Administrators have access to the KAoS Policy Admin Tool 
(KPAT) which is used to block access to the Gao domain. The purpose of KPAT is to provide an 
easy-to-use domain management interface for Coalition agent system administrators (SysAds) to 
control the behaviour of groups of agents dynamically. Coalition agent policies can be developed 
and verified in advance and stored in a policy library, or they can be created and enforced on-the-
fly. By providing domain management through policies, rather than through requiring agent 
developers to write special purpose code, three benefits accrue: 
• the burden on agent developers is reduced; 
• changes in policy can be effected dynamically on software agents to change their 
behaviour at run-time without changes to the agent code; 
• policies can be enforcement on malicious agents without them knowing anything about 
this in advance or even at all. 
 
A policy is defined to block communication from the Gao agents and it is selected and 
committed - which changes the domain policies such that the Gao information is excluded. Once 
access to the Gao domain has been turned off, the planners refresh the MBP's display by 
requesting an update of information through the Coalition agent network. It is found that many of 
the ground unit positions alter. This is because they are now only using the accurate information 
from observers in the field and not on the misinformation from the Gao observer agent. This has 
demonstrated another feature of the agent infrastructure - robustness and the ability of the system 
to reconfigure automatically as levels of service change and as entities come and go.  
 
32.  The final part of the demonstration is driven by the fact that Gao is unhappy at this turn 
of events and covertly begins a denial-of-service attack. At the start of the UNWAFB 
deployment an 'observer' domain was created containing Dartmouth Gao Observer (DGO) and 
Dartmouth Agadez Observer (DAO) agents. Gao requested that one of its agents (Gao Agadez 
Observer, GAO) is put on the sensor platform that is hosting DAO, so that it can observe Agadez 
movements independently. Because there is some mistrust of Gao, permission is granted, but 
GAO is required to run under the NOMADS environment, which allows the SysAds to change 
and monitor the computing resources given to an agent. After the Gao Intel domain is cut off, 
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Gao intends to avenge itself by launching a denial of service attack on the DAO host machine 
(by writing continuously to hard disk and using up CPU and network resources) by its GAO 
agent within the observer domain.  
 
 
Figure 7 - The NOMADS Guard Display 
 
33.  A sentinel function of the NOMADS guard (see Figure 7 above) monitors the resources 
used by the GAO agent. At first, the average computing resource consumption of the GAO agent 
is reasonable, but when the denial-of-service attack is launched, the GAO agent consumes 
resources excessively. In consequence of the attack, the (friendly) DAO agent's ability to 
perform its tasks is slowed to a halt. The KAoS domain administration services must not only be 
able to respond to administrator-requested policy changes, but also automatic event-driven 
changes. A sentinel function of the NOMADS guard detects the denial-of-service attack. It 
automatically responds to the attack by reducing the resource limits set (the original limits before 
the attack are shown as the horizontal red bars in Figure 7) of the GAO agent and in effect 
neutralises the attack. 
34.  In summary, the demonstration has shown part of a realistic UN supported Coalition 
operation involving several command HQs, organisational, national and functional entities 
working together in a software agent enabled infrastructure with various levels of access and 
functionality. The demonstration has shown how legacy systems can be agent -wrapped and 




Section 6 - Assessment of Software Agents 
 
Technical Progress to Date 
 
35.  To date, the key technical achievements of SACIS and CoAX are as follows: 
• we have demonstrated a proof -of-concept, agent-based Coalition C2 architecture within a 
representative Coalition scenario; 
• for the first time, we have shown legacy and previously stand-alone US and UK military 
systems inter-operating via agent technology; 
• we have shown how agent organisation, behaviour, security and resources can be 
managed by explicit Coalition policy control; 
• specifically, the demonstrations have shown certain features and benefits of an agent-
enabled environment such as: 
• operators working collaboratively with agents; 
• agents working semi-autonomously 'in the background'; 
• the robustness of an agent-enabled infrastructure (the DARPA CoABS Grid) - 
reconfiguring automatically; 
• access being provided (on demand) to remote, previously stand-alone and 
dispersed information and remote operation of applications; 
• agents' use of communication and computing resources being controlled; 
• the ability to create shared understanding and improved visualisation. 
 
Assessment and Future Research Programme 
 
36.  The SACIS research started in April 1999 and the CoAX project officially began in 
February 2000 and we believe that we have made good early progress towards demonstrating the 
utility of agent technology in Coalition operations. We have put together a prototype Coalition 
C2 architecture that supports and embraces heterogeneity and have exercised this in an agent -
based C2 demonstration that enacts Coalition activities within the Binni scenario. The CoABS 
Grid and KAoS domain management capabilities have allowed us to interoperate US and UK 
military systems as well as a variety of agent-based information resources. In should be noted 
that the CoABS Grid, in particular, has played a vital role in rapid integration of sys tems. 
37.  Assessment work funded by DARPA CoABS programme has reported favourably on the 
performance issues of agent-enabled infrastructures and the experiences of the SACIS and CoAX 
Teams have shown that the agent-wrapping of legacy systems and the integration of different 
agent systems at short notice is relatively straightforward. Indications are that agent wrapping is 
simpler where systems 'expose' more of their internal information and methods and work is also 
in hand in this area. In addition, a heterogeneous set of agents can be made to interoperate as 
long as implementers adhere to some minimum set of message and other standards. Also, 
heterogeneity should be accepted and embraced as it is seen as being inevitable and can actually 
be beneficial in a number of cases - especially in security terms. 
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38.  The next phases of the research work are designed to further enhance the software agents 
and provide a more exacting demonstration capability. These phases are described below: 
a. CoAX Binni 2001: This work is due in July 2001 and will: 
• move on to supporting the execution phase of conflict (which is characterised by 
being more uncertain and which has more demanding performance requirements) 
with software agents - see Figure 8 below; 
• take on and address C2 process tracking; 
• improve domain management by allowing nested and overlapping domains; 
• address both the planning and execution phases of a realistic military scenario; 
• involve up to 45 agents in 7 domains that are part of a realistic and extended 






















More Linear More Linear
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Covers all the above, plus greater levels of dynamic response and adaption
to changes in Coalition structures, capabilities and services.
 
Figure 8 - Phases of an Operation and the CoAX demonstrations 
 
b. CoAX Binni 2002: This work is due in April 2002 and will: 
• add the ability to monitor, plan and control the Coalition C2 processes and deal 
with events a rising from execution; 
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• include obligation management, eg: ensure that agents are meeting their 
commitments; 
• involve the dynamic creation of ‘virtual Coalition organisation’; 
• see agents and domains added to Coalition structure ‘on-the-fly’; 
• deal with dynamic Coalition tasks and processes;  
• use a dynamic Coalition scenario, with partners joining / leaving unpredictably; 
• cope with a dynamic, uncertain and event-driven execution environment. 
 
This work has been submitted for inclusion in Millennium Challenge / JEFX 2002. 
 
c. In the research so far, a certain amount of hardwiring and pre-agreed formats have 
been employed and in the next phase of the work semantic web technology will be used 
to investigating further how run-time interoperability can be achieved 'on-the-fly' as it is 
felt that semantic interoperability can significantly improve agent collaboration. 
 
Military Implications of the Results 
 
39.  Software Agents can be viewed as entities acting on behalf of, mediating or supporting 
the actions of human users and having the ability to carry out tasks autonomously to achieve 
goals or assist the activities of the users. This research project has shown how software agents 
can carry out tasks which enable interoperability between information systems and infrastructure 
services brought together in a ‘come-as-you-are’ Coalition. 
40.  In the experiments so far, the software agents operated in a number of roles. They have 
worked ‘in the background’ – through matchmaking, domain management, process management 
and other agent services – to find, establish and maintain the infrastructure, information and 
procedural links necessary to achieve and support interoperability in a dynamically changing 
environment. In addition, they have worked collaboratively with human operators, mediating 
requests for information and formatting and displaying the results almost transparently.  
41.  Dealing effectively with unpredictable changes – owing, for example, to the destructive 
activities of opponents or because of systems failing and services being withdrawn – is a typical 
Coalition problem where software agents could make a significant contribution. So far, we have 
shown that a software agent infrastructure is robust and, to some extent, is 'self-healing'. Our aim 
is to investigate this further to show that software agents can provide agility, robustness, 
flexibility and additional functionality beyond that provided by the individual Coalition partners. 
42.  Our conclusion is that software agents, together with agent-based infrastructures and 
services provided by the CoABS Grid and KAoS, could play a key role in supporting Coalition 
operations. We think that this technology will provide the ability to bring together and integrate 
systems quickly to aid in all aspects of Coalition operations, without sacrificing security and 
control. Our long-term goal is to use this technology in the creation, support and dynamic 
reconfiguration of virtual organisations - with Coalitions being an archetypal and timely example 
of an area where this technology is vitally neede d.  
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Section 7 - Concluding Remarks 
 
43.  The central hypothesis that is being investigated in SACIS and CoAX is that the agent-
based computing paradigm is a good fit to the kind of computational support needed in Coalition 
operations. Thus far, we have shown that agents can usefully share and manage access to 
information across a stylised Coalition architecture in support of planning. This has required our 
gaining knowledge and expertise in, for example, agent communication languages, agent 
infrastructures, agent policy management [12], and agent legacy-system integration. 
44.  Over the next year, SACIS and CoAX have a series of technical demonstrations planned 
of increasing complexity. Building on the baseline capabilities already established, in the next 
phases of CoAX our priorities will be on demonstrating how agent technology can deal with the 
dynamic aspects of Coalition formation and the uncertainties of the execution phase where we 
will face an opponent. We envisage showing partners joining or leaving, services becoming 
unavailable, as well as agents aiding the human problem-solving and decision-making process in 
response to external events.  
45.  One early lesson has been that the Cyberspace inhabited by the software agents should 
not be seen just as an information pipe between humans - it is a Battlespace in its own right. This 
indicates that 'Cyberspace Superiority' should be obtained (as for any other part of the 
Battlespace) and that to achieve this it is essential that the Coalition Forces are able to act 
decisively inside Cyberspace. As humans cannot physically enter Cyberspace, it may be that the 
only way that Cyberspace Superiority can be achieved is though the use of a variety of software 
agents acting on behalf of or mediating the actions of human users. 
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